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Abstract
We reconstruct Karl Friston’s active inference and give a geometrical
interpretation of it.
1 Introduction
In Biehl et al. (2018) we have reconstructed the active inference approach as
used in Friston et al. (2015). Here we present a radically shortened and more
general account of active inference. We also present for the first time a geomet-
rical interpretation of active inference.
We use the same notation and model as in Biehl et al. (2018). There readers
can also find a translation table to the notations used in Friston et al. (2015,
2016).
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Figure 1: Bayesian networks of the PA-loop
The active inference agent we are describing in the following interacts with
an environment according to the perception-action loop defined by the Bayesian
network in Section 1. There, we write Et for the environment state, St for the
sensor value, At for the action, and Mt for the memory state of the agent at
time step t. We assume that for all time steps t the transition dynamics of the
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Figure 2: Bayesian network of the generative model.
environment p(et+1|at+1, et) and the dynamics of the sensors p(st|et) are time-
homogenous and fixed. We further assume that the agent has perfect memory,
i.e. at all times mt := sa≺t.
The difference to the setup of reinforcement learning for partially observable
Markov decision problems is that there is no explicit reward signal. Instead the
agent uses a motivation functional M which evaluates the agent’s current beliefs
about the consequences of actions (see Section 3). A standard reward signal Rt
can easily be added as an additional sensor value by letting St → (St, Rt).
With the environment, sensor, and memory dynamics fixed it remains to
specify the action generation mechanism p(at|mt). We first describe this in two
separate steps, inference and action selection, that can be performed one after
the other. Then we show how active inference combines the two steps in one
optimization procedure. On the way we also define motivation functionals.
Action generation in more detail: The agent employs a parameterized model
in order to predict the consequences of its actions. At each time step it receives
a new sensor value in response to an action and updates its model by condi-
tioning on the new memory state. Additionally conditioning on the various
possible future actions (or policies) results in a conditional probability distri-
bution which we call the active posterior. The active posterior represents the
agent’s beliefs about the consequences (for future sensors, latent variables, and
internal parameters) of its actions. Obtaining the active posteriors is referred
to as the inference step. Subsequently, the agent constructs (using softmax)
a probability distribution over future actions by assigning high probability to
those actions whose entries in the active posterior achieve high values when
plugged into the motivation functional (e.g. expected future reward if there is
an explicit one). This results in the what we call the induced policy. Obtaining
the latter is referred to as the action selection step. Afterwards the agent can
simply sample from this induced policy to generate actions.
In active inference, both inference and action selection are turned into op-
timization problems and then combined in a multiobjective optimization. The
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inference step can be turned into an optimization using variational inference
(see e.g. Bishop, 2011; Blei et al., 2017). Variational inference introduces a
variational version of the active posterior. Since the variational active posterior
generally differs from the original/true active posterior it leads to a, generally
different, variational induced policy. Action selection is then formulated as an
optimization by introducing an additional (third) policy whose divergence from
the variational induced policy is to be minimized. Active inference then op-
timizes a sum of the respective objective functions and afterwards the agent
can sample from the third policy. With a bit of notational trickery this can be
written in the form Friston uses, which looks similar to a variational free energy
(or evidence lower bound).
2 Inference
The agent performs inference on the generative model given by the Bayesian
network in Section 1. The variables that model variables occurring outside of
p(a|m) in the perception-action loop (Section 1), are denoted as hatted versions
of their counterparts. To clearly distinguish the probabilities defined by the
generative model from the true dynamics, we use the symbol q instead of p.
Here, θ1, θ2, θ3 are the parameters of the model. To save space,write θ :=
(θ1, θ2, θ3).
The last modelled time step Tˆ can be chosen as Tˆ = T (T is the final step
of the PA-loop), but it is also possible to always set it to Tˆ = t + n, in which
case n specifies a future time horizon from current time step t.
Active posterior At time t the agent plugs its experience sa≺t into its genera-
tive model by setting Aˆτ = aτ , for τ < t and Sˆτ = sτ , for τ < t and conditioning
on these. The consequences of future actions can be obtained by additionally
conditioning on each possible future action sequence aˆt:Tˆ . This leads to the con-
ditional probability distribution that we call the active posterior (the experience
sa≺t is considered fixed):
q(sˆt:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ|aˆt:Tˆ , sa≺t) (1)
Variational active posterior In active inference the active posterior is ob-
tained via variational inference (see e.g. Blei et al., 2017).
We write r (instead of p or q) to indicate variational probability distri-
butions and φ for the entire set of variational parameters. Note, the pa-
rameter φ contains parameters for each of the future action sequences aˆ
t:Tˆ
i.e. φ = (φaˆ
t:Tˆ
)
aˆ
t:Tˆ
∈ATˆ−t+1 . The variational active posterior is of the form
r(sˆt:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ|aˆt:Tˆ , φ). To construct the variational active posterior we cycle
through the possible future action sequences aˆt:Tˆ and compute each entry. For
a fixed aˆ
t:Tˆ the variational free energy, also known as the (negative) evidence
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lower bound (ELBO) in variational inference literature, is defined as:
F [aˆt:Tˆ ,φ, sa≺t] :=∑
sˆ
t:Tˆ
,eˆ
0:Tˆ
∫
r(sˆ
t:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ|aˆt:Tˆ , φ) log
r(sˆ
t:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ|aˆt:Tˆ , φ)
q(s≺t, sˆt:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ|aˆt:Tˆ , a≺t)
dθ
(2)
Then variational inference amounts to solving for each aˆ
t:Tˆ the optimisation
problem:
φ∗aˆ
t:Tˆ
,sa≺t
:= argmin
φ
F [aˆt:Tˆ , φ, sa≺t]. (3)
3 Action selection and induced policy
Let ∆AP be the space of active posteriors. Then a motivation functional is
a map M : ∆AP × A
Tˆ−t+1 → R taking active posteriors d(., ., .|.) ∈ ∆AP
and a sequences of future actions aˆ
t:Tˆ to a real value M(d(., ., ., |.), aˆt:Tˆ ) ∈ R.
An example of a motivation functional is the expected value of the sum over
future rewards (if one of the sensor values is defined as the reward). Other
possibilities can be found in Biehl et al. (2018). Now define for some γ ∈ R+0 and
some motivation functionalM a softmax operator σMγ mapping active posteriors
d(., ., .|.) to probability distributions over future action sequences:
σMγ [d(., ., .|.)](aˆt:Tˆ ) :=
1
Z(γ)
eγM(d(.,.,.|.),aˆt:Tˆ ). (4)
Then we call
q(aˆ
t:Tˆ |sa≺t) := σ
M
γ [q(., ., .|., sa≺t)](aˆt:Tˆ ) (5)
the induced policy of active posterior q(., ., .|., sa≺t) and M. And we call
r(aˆt:Tˆ |φ) := σ
M
γ [r(., ., .|., φ)](aˆt:Tˆ ) (6)
the induced variational policy of variational active posterior r(., ., .|., φ) and M.
Note that,if φ is not the optimized parameter φ∗sa≺t then the induced vari-
ational policy cannot be expected to lead to actions that actually reflect the
preferences encoded in M. On the other hand, if the true active posterior, or
the optimized variational active posterior are used and γ →∞ the induced pol-
icy should correspond to the best guess for an agent with the given generative
model, variational distributions, and motivation M.
4 Active inference
Now introduce an additional variational policy s(aˆt:Tˆ |ρ) parameterized by ρ in
order to approximate the induced variational policy r(aˆ
t:Tˆ |φ) of the variational
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Figure 3: On top the space of probility distributions over future action sequences
∆AˆTˆ−t+1 on the bottom the space of active posteriors ∆AP .
posterior (action selection). To make this happen we can minimize the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between the two.
To do inference and action selection at once we can then minimize the sum of
the variational free energy (Equation (2)) and the Kullback-Leibler divergence
w.r.t. ρ, φ (for an illustration of the situation see Figure 3):∑
aˆ
t:Tˆ
s(aˆt:Tˆ |ρ)F [aˆt:Tˆ , φ, sa≺t]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D1
+KL[s(Aˆt:Tˆ |ρ)|| r(Aˆt:Tˆ |φ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2
(7)
If φ and ρ are optimized the agent can then sample actions from s(aˆ
t:Tˆ |ρ).
Now if we change notation and let s(aˆt:Tˆ |ρ) → r(aˆt:Tˆ |ρ) and r(aˆt:Tˆ |φ) →
q(aˆ
t:Tˆ |φ) then the above can be rewritten as:
∑
aˆ
t:Tˆ
,sˆ
t:Tˆ
,eˆ
0:Tˆ
∫
r(sˆt:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ, aˆt:Tˆ |ρ, φ) log
r(sˆt:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ, aˆt:Tˆ |ρ, φ)
q(s≺t, sˆt:Tˆ , eˆ0:Tˆ , θ, aˆt:Tˆ |φ, a≺t)
dθ.
(8)
This looks similar to a variational free energy or evidence lower bound and is
the form of the free energy found in Friston et al. (2016). What distinguishes
it from a true variational free energy is the occurrence of the parameter φ in
numerator and denominator.
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